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Abstract
In this paper, we show that imposing linear penalties on inflation and income divergences to
a common central bank could be an interesting solution to stabilization problems in a
heterogeneous monetary Union. We find an “optimal contract” for monetary policy which
enforces the optimal solution for maximizing Union-wide welfare. This contract may provide
a good institutional response to stabilization problems raised by monetary policy
transmission asymmetries, as described in De Grauwe Senegas (2004).
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1. Introduction 
 
How  the  common  monetary  policy  design  in  the  Euro  area  should  take  into 
consideration asymmetries in the transmission channel among the different member-states is a 
major clause of concern for the European Central Bank (ECB). Asymmetries in the Euro area 
are widely recognized and the ECB more and more wonders about the suitable conduct of 
monetary  policy  in  such  a  heterogeneous  environment.  Thinking  about  the  enlargement 
process,  it  is  no  doubt  that  heterogeneity  will  increase  within  the  EMU,  either  in  the 
transmission  channel  of  monetary  policy  or  in  idiosyncratic  shocks
1.  However,  for  the 
moment, the main objective of the ECB is to preserve price stability for the euro area as a 
whole,  paying  most  of  its  attention  to  Union-wide  output  and  (principally)  inflation  and 
neglecting, at least on the level of principles, inflation and output divergences in Union. 
Yet,  the  optimality  of  such  a  strategy  based  upon  Union-wide  magnitudes  can  be 
questioned,  especially  in  the  presence  of  substantial  divergences  within  the  Euro  area.  A 
number of recent theoretical studies have analyzed the implications of Union heterogeneity on 
the  optimal  monetary  policy  design.  De  Grauwe  (2000),  Gros  &  Hefeker  (2002)  and  De 
Grauwe & Senegas (2004) have shown in particular that the presence of asymmetries in the 
transmission channel
2 is a case for taking account of “national information” and not only 
“average information”. More specifically, by attempting to stabilize only average inflation 
rate and output-gap, the common central bank reaches a lower level of social welfare than that 
which would be reached if she were concerned by the stabilization of national inflation rates 
and output-gaps. Thus, using national information in the design of the common monetary 
policy allows the common central bank to deal with the heterogeneity induced by asymmetry. 
So,  if  the  transmission  asymmetry  of  monetary  policy  increases  with  the  enlargement  of 
EMU, it will raise the need to consider national information in the formulation of optimal 
monetary policies in the Union.  
Nevertheless,  a  central  question  remains  how  to  take  national  information  into 
consideration. Two responses to this question can be envisaged: an institutional response, 
inspired  from  the  recent  results  in  the  literature  (De  Grauwe  &  Senegas,  2004),  or  a 
contractual response, inspired from the literature on the agency problem in a principal-agent 
relationship framework, optimally solved if the principal imposes the “good” contract to the 
agent.  
On the one hand, De Grauwe & Senegas (2004) suggest that the common central bank 
should minimize a loss function defined as a weighted average of national loss functions. This 
suggestion corresponds, in practice, to an institutional reform allowing monetary policy to 
come  from  negotiations  (discussions)  in  a  Governing  Council  formed  by  delegates  of  all 
member states who defend national interests. In the context of the EMU, such an institutional 
solution requires a major change in the conduct of monetary policy because nowadays, “as 
laid down in the Treaty, each Member of the Governing Council is therefore well aware that 
he or she is not a representative of a country (…) but acts (…) in deciding the appropriate 
conduct of monetary policy for the euro area as a whole”.
3 Furthermore, the negotiation 
procedure  could  eventually  give  rise  to  inflation  biases  or  conflicts  conducting  to  non-
cooperative solutions in the Union, so that the cure might become worse than the disease.  
On the other hand, we propose in this paper an alternative procedure for monetary 
policy to capture national information. We analyze a contractual solution in which the Union 
                                                 
1 For some empirical evidences of asymmetries of  national shocks or transmission  mechanisms in the new 
members of the European Union, see Angeloni & al. (2005).    
2 If asymmetries arise only in macroeconomic shocks, using aggregated or national data doesn’t affect the Union 
social welfare and there is no reason to prefer the second strategy to the first one (see De Grauwe, 2000). 
3 See the declaration following the Governing Council meeting dated from March, 30 (2000).   2 
(acting as the “principal”) would delegate monetary policy to an “agent” who is the common 
central bank. With such an institutional arrangement, the Union still leaves monetary policy in 
the common central bank care, who acts as an independent agent, but the “principal” has to 
ensure  the  appropriate  incentives  to  the  “agent”.  We  search  for  the  optimal  form  of  this 
delegation, namely an “optimal contract” for the common central bank, and we show that 
such  an  optimal  contract  exists.  In  the  contract,  national  information  is  taken  into 
consideration by the monetary policy decision-making process if penalties are imposed to the 
central bank in function of the weighted standard deviations of inflation and unemployment in 
the  Union.  Well-defined  values  for  these  penalties  can  enforce  the  optimal  solution  for 
monetary policy, allowing maximizing Union-wide social welfare. Moreover, we show that 
the optimal contract is very simple and is not state contingent, as in Walsh (1995). 
 
We first summarize, in section 2, De Grauwe & Senegas (2004) framework before 
studying the “optimal contract” for monetary policy in a similar framework, in section 3. 
Section 4 proves that our solution is very general and not model-dependent, while section 5 
dresses some concluding remarks. 
 
2. De Grauwe & Senegas (2004) model 
 
De Grauwe & Senegas (hereafter DGS) compare two main strategies for monetary 
policy: a strategy based on non-aggregated national data (NA strategy) and a strategy based 
on Euro-aggregated data (EA strategy). To prove the superiority of the NA strategy, DGS use 
a  standard  macroeconomic  model  in  which  an  individual  economy  is  described  by  the 
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with the specification of national loss function: 
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Each country is indexed by i, for  N i ,..., 2 , 1 = ,  i U  is the current unemployment rate in 
the country i and 
*
i U  is the related natural rate of unemployment. p  is the inflation rate in the 
Union (there is no inflation divergence in the Union), 
e p  is the expected inflation rate and e  
is  a  white-noise  supply  shock.  The  asymmetry  in  the  transmission  of  monetary  policy  is 
introduced by the way of  i a  coefficients. 
Under the first strategy (“National Aggregation” procedure), the common central bank 
minimizes: 
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where  i m  is the weight of country i in the social welfare function. 
 
The solution of the optimisation program is (see DGS for details):  
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m q is a measure of the dispersion in the national 
transmission parameters. 
 
In the second strategy (“Euro-area-Aggregation” procedure), the common central bank 
minimizes: 
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The Union-wide social welfare criterion is based upon the ex ante (i.e. before knowing 
the shocks) value of the average of national loss functions in the Union: 
 
[ ]
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Since  ( ) ( )
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2 0
E a q ³ ,  then:  if  the  Central 
Bank chooses to minimize (3) rather than (1), the more heterogeneous the Union, the higher 
the Union-wide social loss. 
De Grauwe & Senegas (2004) explain this difference by the fact that under the EA 
strategy, the monetary authorities are more aggressive in changing the inflation rate than in 
the  NA  strategy  (since: EA NA W ³ W ).  More  generally,  the  problem  is  rather  that  national 
magnitudes are insufficiently stabilized (which comes to the same thing in DGS framework), 
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Thus,  the  Union-wide  unemployment  is  too  much  stabilized  if  monetary  policy 
doesn’t  take  into  account  national  information.  In  a  more  general  model  with  inflation 
divergences in the Union, average (Union-wide) inflation would be also too much stabilized 
(see Gregoriadis et al., 2006). Therefore, under the EA strategy, monetary authorities are too 
“aggressive” in stabilizing average variables (inflation and unemployment) and insufficiently 
aggressive in stabilizing national magnitudes. 
 
3. The “optimal contract” for monetary policy 
 
How could monetary policy become more reactive to national divergences? In this 
section, we are interested in a contractual solution to the issue of EA strategy. Let us suppose 
that the Union, acting as the “principal”, decides to delegate monetary policy to an “agent”, 
who is the common central bank. Moreover, the “principal” imposes to the “agent” linear 
penalties depending on inflation and unemployment divergences. These penalties represent an 
additional cost for the central banker and provide an incentive to fight divergences in the 
Union. We describe such a solution by the fact that, beyond stabilizing average variables in 
the Union, the central bank attempts to stabilize the euro-wide unemployment differential, 
measured as the weighted cross section standard error of this variable: 
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    º - - -       ∑  is the weighted cross section standard error of 
unemployment  (in  deviation  from  its  natural  rate)  and  u l   is  the  coefficient  of  aversion 
towards unemployment divergences. 
 
The timing of the “delegation game” is depicted in Fig. 1: 
 
 
Fig. 1 Time structure of the “delegation game” 
 




First, (i) the agency set the optimal penalty  u l  on unemployment divergences that 
minimizes  ( ) ,
EA NA EA EA W E U p   = L  
% % %  in (5), then ii) the public forms its expectations 
e p , iii) 
shocks  e   arise  and  iv)  the  common  central  bank  chooses  the  inflation  rate 
EA p %   which 
minimizes 
EA L %  in (6). 
 
As usual, the resolution is backward. By minimizing (6) the common central bank sets 
























e p e EA p ~  5 
The optimal penalty on unemployment divergences chosen by the agency at step i), 
namely  the  penalty  obtained  by  minimizing
EA W % ,  is:  u b l = .  With  this  value,
EA NA W = W % , 
EA NA p p = %   and 
EA NA U U = % .  Thus,  monetary  policy  provides  the  Union-wide  first  best: 
( ) ( )
EA NA EA NA NA NA W E E W p p     º L = L º    
% % .  In  other  words,  a  penalty  u b l =   on 
unemployment divergences imposed to the common central bank leads to the optimal solution 
for monetary policy, described in DGS model. 
 
4. A generalization 
 
The contractual solution is not model dependent. Let’s consider the classical form of 
the national loss function:  
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In the first strategy (“National Aggregation” procedure), the common central bank 
minimizes: 
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while in the second strategy (“Euro-area-Aggregation” procedure) it minimizes: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
2 2 2 2 ˆ ˆ
EA
E E u u b U c p p p l s l s L = + + +           (8) 
 
In  the  expressions  (7)  and  (8),  we  have  still  used  the  notations: ˆE E E x x x
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penalties  imposed  on  inflation  and  output  differentials.  These  penalties  ensure  that  the 
common central bank feels some degree of aversion towards inflation and unemployment 
divergences  in  the  Union,  and  look  like  a  “quadratic”  contract  for  central  banker, 
corresponding  to  changing  preferences  for  the  stabilization  of  divergences  relative  to  the 
stabilization of Union-wide magnitudes
4. 
Suppose furthermore that the instrument of the central bank is the interest rate
5  ( ) r . 
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4  One  can  notice  the  analogy  with  the  analysis  of  Rogoff  (1985),  in  which  relative  preferences  for  the 
stabilization of output relative to inflation have to be changed in cases of stabilization biases. 
5 Since there are inflation divergences in this section, the monetary policy instrument can no longer be the 
inflation rate.    6 
By minimizing (8) with respect to r  and rearranging, we obtain: 
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We can easily observe that expressions (9) and (10) are identical if 
*
u b l =  and 
* c p l = ; 
the loss functions (7) and (8) are also identical in this case. Under the “optimal contract”, the 
EA procedure with aversion to divergences is efficient and leads to the optimal regime.  
 
Using our notations, the contractual strategy that can enforce the optimal solution is 
such  that  :  i)  the  agency  sets  the  optimal  penalties 
* c p l =   and  u b l =   on  inflation  and 
unemployment  divergences  that  minimizes 
NA W E   = L  ,  ii)  the  public  forms  its 
expectations, iii) shocks arise and iv) the central bank minimizes 
EA L  in (8). 
 
Thus,  the  first  best  solution  for  monetary  policy  can  be  obtained  by  an  “optimal 
contract” that penalizes the common central bank for inflation and unemployment divergences 
in the Union. The optimal penalties imposed on inflation (respectively on unemployment) 
divergences correspond to the relative weight of inflation (respectively unemployment) in the 
welfare function of the common central bank. The interpretation of this “optimal contract” is 
straightforward:  monetary  policy  takes  Union  heterogeneity  into  account  if  the  common 
central bank is forced to feel some aversion towards inflation and output divergences. 
 
In view of this result, the “contractual solution” seems to be a good candidate for 
solving  the  problem  of  monetary  policy  transmission  asymmetries.  One  could  argue  that 
modifying  the  loss  function  of  the  central  bank  can  be  dangerous  because  the  more 
complicated  the  loss  function  is,  the  more  complicated  the  targeting  rule  is  and  the  less 
transparent monetary policy will be. This could generate a loss of credibility for the central 
banker and make more difficult the adherence to the monetary policy rule. However, this 
contractual solution is not complicated and the “principal” could be interested in it, because 
the penalties proposed are not contingent on shocks. He can set the penalties without having 
any information about shocks and he doesn’t need to have national information; all he has to 
do  is  to  set  the  “good”  level  (l )  for  penalties  and  to  let  the  central  bank  do  her  job. 
Furthermore, the penalties imposed on the dispersion indicators are very appealing because 
they are a very intuitive mechanism based on public knowledge variables. 
The different approaches proposed in the literature to solve the time inconsistency 
problem of the monetary policy could be transposed to discuss the implementation of such an 
“optimal contract”, to solve the stabilization problem of monetary policy asymmetries.  
According  to  the  “legislative  approach”,  mainly  developed  in  Rogoff  (1985),  the 
solution  would  be  to  delegate  monetary  policy  to  an  independent  and  divergence-adverse 
central banker. The difficulty would be to find the central banker endowed with the exact 
degree  of  aversion  towards  inflation  and  unemployment  divergences
6.  Concerning  the 
“targeting” or “contracting” approach, mainly discussed in Walsh (1995), the solution comes 
from an explicit or implicit contract for the common central bank, with divergence oriented 
                                                 
6  Effectively,  if  the  central  banker  is  not  endowed  with  the  “good”  degree  of  aversion  to  inflation  and 
unemployment divergences in the Union, the contractual solution is not necessarily the best solution. This is the 
case, in particular, if the central banker is not interested in unemployment divergences but only in inflation 
divergences (Gregoriadis et al., 2006).   7 
penalties.
7 It could stem from free elections of the agents in charge of monetary policy by 
individual  citizens,  from  a  state-contingent  wage-contract  for  the  central  banker,  from  a 
targeting  rule  with  a  reporting  requirement  or  from  a  “dismissal  rule”  where  the  central 
banker  is  fired  if  he  fails  to  meet  divergence  targets  (see  Walsh,  1995).  Another  similar 
solution, like in Svensson (1997), consists in an optimal reward structure based on a targeting 
rule, including targets in term of inflation and output divergences.
8 Thus, the central banker 





In  this  paper  we  are  interested  in  the  optimal  design  of  monetary  policies  in  a 
heterogeneous monetary Union and we highlight a simple “optimal contract” for monetary 
policy that enforces the optimal solution proposed by De Grauwe and Senegas (2004). 
The  definition  of  this  “optimal  contract”  is,  in  some  way,  close  to  the  solution 
proposed by Walsh (1995) in response to the inflation bias problem for monetary policy, 
except that we exclusively deal with a stabilization problem. This solution consists in linear 
penalties that the “principal” has to impose to the “agent”. While Walsh (1995) proposes 
linear penalties on inflation to solve a credibility problem of monetary policy, we emphasize 
that  linear  penalties  for  inflation  and  unemployment  divergences  in  the  Union  can  be  a 
solution to the stabilization problem of the monetary policy. Moreover, these penalties are not 
model dependent and if they are well defined, as it is the case under the “optimal contract”, 
the common monetary policy produces the first best.  
The  theoretical  solution  of  this  “optimal  contract”  is  straightforward:  the  optimal 
penalties imposed on inflation (respectively on unemployment) divergences correspond to the 
relative  weight  of  inflation  (respectively  unemployment)  in  the  welfare  function  of  the 
common central bank. Nevertheless, the “optimal contract” has some limits.  
In effect, our solution is open to usual criticism addressed to contractual literature in 
monetary policy, namely critics concerning the credibility of the “principal”, the difficulty to 
put in practice the “optimal contract” or to find the “good” definition for penalties. 
Furthermore, were these issues solved the optimal contract would remain difficult to 
implement, because only some Member States take advantage of this contract, while it is 
detrimental to the welfare of others. Effectively De Grauwe & Senegas (2004) show that 
some member states of the Union prefer the EA strategy, while other prefers the NA strategy. 
So, from the point of view of national welfare, the optimal contract is not beneficial to all 
countries of the Union, while it is optimal from the point of view of the Union-wide welfare, a 
result also established in Gregoriadis et al. (2006). Thus, the “optimal contract” might become 
an undesirable source of potential conflicts between the member states of the Union. We 
could however imagine that, since Union-wide benefits exist under the “optimal contract”, the 
welfare gain for countries which take advantage of this contract exceeds the welfare loss for 
the others and, therefore, a compensation system for the last ones is possible. In conclusion, 
even if this contract is not optimal at a national level, it could become, at least, an interesting 
“Pareto improver” one. 
                                                 
7 Penalties can be of financial or “political” (loss of credibility of the central bank, conflicts with Member States 
of the Union,…) nature. Different institutional arrangements corresponding in practice to contracts for central 
banker (like the  « Policy  Target Agreement » established in 1989 in New  Zealand) are discussed in Walsh 
(2001).  
8 Rogoff (1985) also has suggested that targeting rules might be enforced by making the monetary authority’s 
budget depend on adherence to the rule, while Garfinkel and Oh (1993) have proposed, for the same purpose, a 
punishing legislation if the monetary policy fails to achieve the target.   8 
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